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NORIEGA v. PASTRANA: THE SUPREME 
COURT TAKES A STEP BACK  
FROM THE TABLE 
Jason E. Armiger* 
Abstract: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 expressly removed the 
Geneva Conventions as a source of rights for any person litigating against 
the United States or its agents. For General Manuel Noriega, the Geneva 
Conventions provided him with his sole opportunity for relief from what 
is, in his opinion, a grave injustice; without it, he has no hope of returning 
to his home country any time in the near future. Thus, Noriega petitioned 
the Supreme Court and asked the Court to find this restriction to be an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. To perform this 
analysis, the Supreme Court would have had to delve into territory previ-
ously unexplored and narrowly avoided. Ultimately, the Court declined to 
accept certiorari, over a strong objection by Justice Thomas, joined by Jus-
tice Scalia. This Comment argues that the Supreme Court has avoided the 
issue long enough, and should have settled the matter once and for all by 
accepting General Noriega’s challenge. 
Introduction 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s conspicuous involvement in several re-
cent war on terror cases has led one commentator to note that “[w]hat 
the Supreme Court has done is carve itself a seat at the table.”1 The 
Court, in challenging both the executive and legislative branches, has 
asserted that when constitutional rights are threatened, it has a seat in 
the debate.2 It would appear, though, that the Court has taken a step 
back from the table with their recent inaction in Noriega v. Pastrana.3 
 On January 25, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to 
a case that, in the words of Justice Thomas, “would provide much-
needed guidance on . . . important issues with which the political 
branches and federal courts have struggled since we decided Boumedi-
                                                                                                                      
* Jason E. Armiger is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War 15 (2008). 
2 See id. at 14–16. 
3 See Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1002 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
2 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review Vol. 34: E. Supp. 
ene.”4 A Supreme Court decision would “spare detainees and the Gov-
ernment years of unnecessary litigation,” and it is “incumbent upon 
[the Court] to provide . . . guidance . . . on these issues now.”5 Noriega 
presented the Court with the opportunity to decide the constitutional-
ity of Section 5(a) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA)—a 
provision which prevents petitioners like Manuel Noriega from invok-
ing the Geneva Conventions in a civil suit against the United States.6 
Noriega argued that this section of the MCA, which limits the substan-
tive body of rights and relief available to a detained petitioner, is an un-
constitutional suspension of habeas corpus in violation of Article I, § 9, 
cl. 2 of the United States Constitution because no judicial body is per-
mitted to address his claim.7 
 Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the procedural 
history of General Noriega’s case, introduces the constitutional issue 
petitioned to the Supreme Court, and establishes the ongoing rele-
vance of that issue. Part II discusses the texts of the federal statute in 
question, the Constitution, and the Geneva Conventions. The Part dis-
cusses how the issue presented by Noriega’s case is both unique and 
reoccurring, and introduces the competing points of view. In Part III, 
both sides of the issue are further extrapolated, and the significance 
and need for a Supreme Court decision is explained. Part III argues 
that while a decision may not have resolved every concern surrounding 
the constitutional question and the statute, it would nonetheless add a 
significant measure of clarity for future Congressional legislation and 
the decisions of the lower courts. 
I. Background 
 General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the leader of Panama from 
1983 to 1989, was supported by several U.S. Administrations, and was a 
paid informant for U.S. intelligence agencies.8 He was a valuable asset 
for the U.S. government, until it became clear that he was working 
against U.S. drug enforcement efforts, and on February 4, 1988 a Fed-
eral grand jury in Miami indicted General Noriega for numerous con-
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1002–03. 
6 Id. 
7 See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010) (No. 09–35), 
2009 WL 3052656, at *1–2. 
8 Steve Albert, The Case Against the General 1–2 (1993); Christina Jacqueline 
Johns & P. Ward Johnson, State Crime, the Media, and the Invasion of Panama 14 
(Steven A. Egger ed., 1994). 
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spiracy and narcotics-related offenses.9 Throughout the next two years 
tensions increased between Panama and the United States, until the 
situation erupted after the death of an American marine.10 On Decem-
ber 20, 1989, President George Bush ordered the invasion of Panama 
to “safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, 
to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama 
Canal Treaty.”11 
 After several days of armed conflict and standoff, General Manuel 
Noriega was captured by the U.S. military in Panama City.12 He was 
transported to the United States where he awaited trial in the Southern 
District of Florida.13 In April 1992, Noriega was convicted of most of the 
charges,14 and in December the District Court, in a unique post-
sentencing decision, designated Noriega a prisoner of war under Arti-
cles 2, 4, and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (Geneva III).15 Several years later, the District Court 
revisited General Noriega’s case and ordered a reduction of his sen-
tence from forty to thirty years,16 and set his release on parole for Sep-
tember 9, 2007.17 
 In the absence of further developments, it is likely that Noriega 
would have been extradited to Panama following his release from pris-
on in accordance with Article 118 of Geneva III.18 On July 17, 2007, 
however, the Unites States filed a complaint for the extradition of No-
                                                                                                                      
9 Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Sec’y of State, U. S. Dep’t of State, The Case Against 
Panama’s Noriega 1–2 (Aug. 31, 1989), in Current Policy Series, No. 1222, (Office of 
Public Communication, Editorial Division ed., Nov. 1989); Albert, supra note 8, at 34–35; 
Johns & Johnson, supra note 8, at 18. 
10 Albert, supra note 8, at 73–74. 
11 Id. at 74–75. 
12 See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Albert, supra 
note 8, at 85–86. 
13 See Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1510. 
14 See Noriega v. Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009). 
15 United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 793–96 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
16 United States v. Noriega, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380–81 (S.D. Fla. 1999). Judge Hoev-
eler reasoned that the “nature of the . . . confinement” and the “considerable disparity be-
tween the Defendant’s sentence and the sentences actually served by his co-conspirators” 
justified the reduction. Id. at 1380. 
17 Noriega, 564 F.3d at 1293. 
18 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. If hostilities have ended, but the prisoner was 
convicted for an indictable offense, he may be detained until his punishment has been 
completed, as was the case for Noriega in the United States. See id. art. 119. 
4 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review Vol. 34: E. Supp. 
riega to France pursuant to the extradition treaty between the two na-
tions.19 
 In response to his pending extradition, Noriega filed several peti-
tions for writ of habeas corpus to the U.S. District Courts.20 He did not 
contest the validity of the extradition treaty, but instead argued that 
Article 118 of Geneva III, a provision that has never before been inter-
preted by a U.S. court, requires the immediate release and repatriation 
of prisoners of war back to their home country.21 The District Court 
concluded that Geneva III did not bar General Noriega’s extradition to 
France.22 Noriega appealed the court’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which held that Section 5(a) of the MCA expressly 
precludes Noriega from relying on the Geneva Convention as a source 
of rights.23 Noriega’s final hope to avoid extradition to France was ex-
tinguished on January 25, 2010 when his petition for a writ of certiorari 
to the United States Supreme Court was denied, with Justices Thomas 
and Scalia dissenting.24 He was extradited to France on April 26, 2010,25 
where he was sentenced to seven years in French prison after a retrial 
by the 11th Chamber of the Tribunal Correctionnel de Paris found him 
guilty.26 
 In his appeal to the Eleventh Circuit and his petition to the Su-
preme Court, Noriega argued that the Geneva Convention, as “su-
preme Law of the Land,” had become such a fundamental body of sub-
stantive rights that reducing the availability of these rights was an 
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus.27 Noriega may have been 
the last prisoner of war in United States custody, but he is unlikely to be 
the last to question the relationship between Section 5(a) and the Ge-
neva Convention.28 As the dissenters to the Court’s denial of Noriega’s 
petition observed, these questions apply to cases involving noncitizen 
                                                                                                                      
19 Noriega, 564 F.3d at 1293. While General Noriega was being held in the United 
States, France convicted him, in absentia, of laundering $3 million in illicit funds for the 
Medellin drug cartel. David Jolly, French Court Sentences Noriega to 7 Years, N.Y. Times, July 7, 
2010, at A12. 
20 See Noriega, 564 F.3d at 1294. 
21 See Brief for Petitioner at 3–4, Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010) (No. 09–
35), 2009 WL 2173303 at *4. 
22 Noriega, 564 F.3d at 1294. 
23 Id. at 1297. 
24 Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1002. 
25 See Elisabeth Malkin, Noriega Extradited to France to Face Charges, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/americas/27noriega.html. 
26 Jolly, supra note 19. 
27 U.S. Const. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
28 See Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1009 n.15. 
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detainees, the war in the Middle East, and “Guantanamo or other de-
tainee litigation arising out of the conflict with Al Qaeda.”29 
II. Discussion 
 In challenging his extradition to France, General Noriega filed a 
writ of habeas corpus in district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 which, in 
relevant part, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by 
the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any cir-
cuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.”30 This section confers 
jurisdiction of those courts over any person held “in custody in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”31 No-
riega based his claim for relief on Geneva III, to which the United 
States is a signatory, arguing that Article 118 required the immediate 
release and repatriation of prisoners of war after the cessation of hos-
tilities.32 The relevant wording of Article 118 states that “[p]risoners of 
war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation 
of active hostilities.”33 Noriega argued that this requires his return to 
Panama and prohibits his extradition to France.34 Using an arguably 
controversial mode of treaty interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that a plain reading of Article 118 invalidated his claim.35 More signifi-
cant, however, is the dictum36 in the court’s holding that Section 5(a) 
of the MCA “precludes Noriega from invoking the Geneva Conventions 
as a source of rights” at all.37 Section 5(a) of the MCA states that: 
No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any proto-
cols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or pro-
ceeding to which the United States . . . or other agent of the 
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. at 1006, 1008. 
30 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(a) (West 2010); Noriega v. Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290, 1297–99 
(11th Cir. 2009). 
31 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(a), (c)(3). 
32 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 21, at 3–4. 
33 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 18. 
34 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 21, at 9. 
35 Noriega, 564 F.3d at 1297–99. The Eleventh Circuit adopted an identical method of 
interpreting the treaty first performed by Judge Hoeveler of the District Court of the 
Southern District of Florida. Compare id. with United States v. Noriega, 694 F. Supp. 2d 
1268, 1270–73 (S.D. Fla. 2007). Some analysis suggests that both courts may have gotten 
the interpretation wrong. See Matthew Reichstein, Note, The Extradition of General Manuel 
Noriega: An Application of International Criminal and Humanitarian Law to Answer the Question, 
“If So, Where Should He Go?”, 22 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 857, 875–77 (2008) (concluding Judge 
Hoeveler misinterpreted the treaty). 
36 See Noriega, 564 F.3d at 1297–98 (“assuming arguendo”) (dictum). 
37 Id. at 1292. 
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United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the 
United States or its States or territories.38 
Noriega objected to this determination, asserting that if the MCA strips 
him of the ability to challenge his extradition, then Section 5(a) is an 
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus.39 Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of 
the U.S. Constitution requires that “[t]he privilege of the Writ of Ha-
beas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion 
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”40 
 Although treaties are considered to be the supreme law of the 
land, a statute which comes subsequent in time and conflicts with the 
intent of the treaty will override the treaty.41 This has become known as 
the “last-in-time rule.”42 This rule ordinarily would permit Section 5(a) 
to override the protections of the Geneva Conventions, were they in 
force at the time it was enacted.43 It makes no difference if the treaty 
was self-executing or not; if it was in force, a statute may nullify it.44 
However, because Section 5(a) may be limiting the availability of ha-
beas corpus in violation of constitutional guarantees, this is arguably 
more than a case of a statute merely overriding a treaty.45 Noriega ar-
gued that by excluding the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights, 
this statute narrows the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.46 If the Supreme 
Court had accepted certiorari, it would have been the first time it con-
sidered whether limiting § 2241 implicates the Suspension Clause.47 
 This is not the first time in recent history that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has been asked to decide the constitutionality of habeas-stripping 
claims under the MCA.48 In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court held that Sec-
                                                                                                                      
38 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 
10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950w and other sections of Titles 10, 18, 28, and 42). 
39 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 2. 
40 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
41 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 509 n.5 (2007); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 
194 (1888). 
42 Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conven-
tions, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 322, 339 (2007). 
43 Id. at 339–40. 
44 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 509 n.5; see Bradley, supra note 42, at 339 (concluding that even 
if the Geneva Conventions were self-executing, it is his view that Congress had sufficiently 
precluded judicial enforcement). 
45 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, The Geneva Conventions, and 
the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 73, 93–94 (2007). 
46 See Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1006 (2010). 
47 See id. 
48 See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (evaluating the constitutional-
ity of MCA § 7). 
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tion 7 of the MCA, which prevented all federal district courts from con-
sidering habeas corpus claims by “enemy combatants” and failed to 
provide an adequate substitute for their claims, was an unconstitutional 
violation of the Suspension Clause.49 The decision affirmed the consti-
tutional guarantee that federal trial and appellate courts will hear 
claims of fundamental rights violations by noncitizen detainees.50 The 
Court, however, declined to identify the specific substantive protections 
of habeas corpus; expressly avoiding the question of the “content of the 
law” embodying the protections of the writ.51 
 The “content of the law” embodying the protections of the writ has 
been notoriously difficult to identify.52 As a starting point, the Supreme 
Court has stated that the writ cannot have regressed, and “at the abso-
lute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 
1789.”53 In a subsequent case, the Court commented on the “possibility 
that the protections of the Suspension Clause have expanded” since 
then,54 and has also held that “the Suspension Clause . . . refers to the 
writ as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789.”55 It is clear that 
the writ is flexible and has expanded, at least to a small degree, since 
the Judiciary Act of 1789.56 Although the force of the writ is derived 
from statute, its constitutional protections likely expand in a common-
law fashion.57 The Writ has grown jurisdictionally, procedurally, and 
substantively as our understanding of constitutional rights has 
evolved.58 The “difficult and significant” task would be determining ex-
actly to which degree it has expanded today.59 
 Several recent cases have questioned—though none have articu-
lated with precision—exactly what substantive protections are embod-
                                                                                                                      
49 Id. at 792. 
50 Id. at 732, 798. 
51 Id. at 798. 
52 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 n.13 (2001); see Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Melt-
zer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 
2029, 2037 (2007); Gerald R. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of 
Aliens, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 961, 980 (1998). 
53 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301. 
54 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746. 
55 Felker v. Tupin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996). 
56 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 52, at 2043–45, 2051, 2063. 
57 See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial 
Contexts, and American Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 687–694, 699–714 (2008). 
58 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473–75 (2004) (expanding habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion to detainees at Guantanamo Bay); Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 
485–86 (1973) (relaxing limits on habeas corpus jurisdiction and preserving timely re-
view); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 52, at 2043. 
59 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 304. 
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ied in the writ of habeas corpus.60 This has occurred most notably in 
the litigation arising out of the conflict in the Middle East, and occa-
sionally in cases involving immigration.61 
 In INS v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court declined to answer a question 
similar to the one Noriega presented: “[W]hether statutory effort to 
limit § 2241 implicates the Suspension Clause.”62 The respondent was a 
resident alien, facing deportation for a criminal conviction.63 The At-
torney General argued that a 1996 amendment to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 removed his pre-existing discretion to waive de-
portation.64 He also argued that the statute removed the jurisdiction of 
any court to use § 2241 to review deportation claims made by aliens in 
certain circumstances.65 Had the Attorney General’s claims been true, 
the result would have been that no court would hear St. Cyr’s statutory 
claim, similar to the ultimate result of Noriega’s Geneva III claim.66 
 In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress neither in-
tended to remove the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts, nor to 
apply the statute retroactively, thus allowing St. Cyr to achieve his de-
sired result.67 With this holding, the Court narrowly avoided answering 
the “content of the law” question, which they admitted would be “diffi-
cult and significant.”68 Justice Scalia, in his dissent, faced the question 
head on, pointing out that Congress “permanently altered [the writ’s] 
content.”69 He continued by stating that, in his opinion, Congress can 
certainly act as it did, but the important question is “[w]hat habeas re-
lief” is alterable?70 He proposed two answers to the question: (1) Ha-
beas relief is never alterable, and the Suspension Clause is a “one-way 
ratchet” that can only add rights and never subtract them; or (2) “the 
Suspension Clause guarantees the common-law right to habeas corpus, 
as it was understood when the Constitution was ratified.”71 The ques-
                                                                                                                      
60 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798; St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 n.13. 
61 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798; St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 n.13. 
62 Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1006–07; St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 n.13. 
63 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293. 
64 Id. at 294–95. 
65 See id. at 327–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
66 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297. 
67 Id. at 314, 326. 
68 Id. at 304. 
69 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. at 341. 
71 Id. at 341–42. Justice Scalia remarks that the first result is absurd, and if the second 
were correct, then the common-law understanding of the Writ at the time of ratification 
“did not include the right to obtain discretionary release.” Id. at 342. 
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tion of what relief is alterable is what Justices Thomas and Scalia wanted 
to answer in Noriega v. Pastrana.72 
III. Analysis 
 The denial of certiorari is significant because the Supreme Court 
has continued to leave two important questions unanswered: (1) To 
what extent can Congress restrict access to substantive rights once they 
have been made available under § 2241; and (2) if the Geneva Conven-
tions are not protected by the Suspension Clause, then to what extent 
have they been restricted by the MCA? Answering these questions 
would have provided much-needed guidance for lower courts, the U.S. 
legislature, and for the international community in understanding U.S. 
application of the Conventions.73 
 In considering the first question, it is possible that as understand-
ing of the guarantees of the Constitution evolves over time, an under-
standing of the rights it protects evolves as well.74 Most of these rights 
come from the Constitution, but some may also come from statutes and 
treaties, because all three of these sources of rights are “the supreme 
Law of the Land.”75 As Justice Scalia mentioned in his dissent in INS v. 
St. Cyr, it is unlikely that every statute or treaty that could be relied on as 
a source of rights is un-retractable through future legislation.76 It is 
plausible, however, that some sources of rights, in this case the Geneva 
Conventions, confer protections so important that limiting one’s access 
to the judiciary by removing the Convention’s protections is an uncon-
stitutional suspension of access to the courts.77 
 The Geneva Conventions have long been recognized as an impor-
tant and indispensible source of rights in U.S. courts.78 The United 
States signed the original 1864 Geneva Convention in 1882, and has 
remained a signatory since, currently as a member of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.79 To date, over 190 sovereigns have ratified the Conven-
                                                                                                                      
72 See Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1006–07. 
73 Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1006–07 (2010); see Deborah N. Pearlstein, Saying 
What the Law Is, 1 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. (Online) (Nov. 6, 2006), http://hlpronline.com/ 
2006/11/saying-what-the-law-is/. 
74 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 52, at 2043. 
75 U.S. Const. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
76 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 341–42 (11th Cir. 2001) (Scalia J., dissenting). 
77 See Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1006 (“Only we can determine if the Eleventh Circuit cor-
rectly rejected that argument.”). 
78 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577, 633 (2006). 
79 Jonathan G. Odom, Beyond Arm Bands and Arms Banned: Chaplains, Armed Conflict, 
and the Law, 49 Naval L. Rev. 1, 9 & n.38 (2002). 
10 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review Vol. 34: E. Supp. 
tions.80 When the Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions submitted the Geneva Conventions for Senate approval, it re-
marked that the Conventions “may rightly be regarded as a landmark 
in the struggle to obtain . . . humane treatment in accordance with the 
most approved international usage.”81 It also commented that “[t]he 
United States has a proud tradition of support for individual rights, 
human freedom, and the welfare and dignity of man,” thus “[a]pproval 
of these conventions . . . would be fully in conformity with this great 
tradition.”82 When the Constitution was drafted, neither the framers 
nor the world could have envisioned that a document as important in 
scope as the Geneva Conventions would have developed over time to 
protect the rights of soldiers, military personnel, prisoners of war, civil-
ians, and many others involved in armed conflict throughout the 
world.83 Philip Spoerri, Director of International Law for the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, writes that “[t]he real value of the 
Conventions lies not alone in the good they help to achieve, but . . . in 
the yet greater evil they have helped to prevent. . . . [W]ithout the rules 
contained in the Conventions the situation would be far worse.”84 
 Recent Supreme Court cases, especially those involving the conflict 
in the Middle East, frequently reference the Geneva Conventions as an 
indispensible source of rights for litigants, and a check on executive 
power.85 Decided prior to the enactment of Section 5(a), Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld expressly determined that the Geneva Conventions are very 
relevant to determining the types of protections guaranteed to enemy 
combatants captured abroad.86 The Court found that the Conventions 
required that Hamdan be “tried by a ‘regularly constituted court af-
fording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensi-
                                                                                                                      
80 Philip Spoerri, Director of International Law, ICRC, The Geneva Conventions of 
1949: Origins and Current Significance (Aug. 12, 2009) (transcript available at http:// 
www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/geneva-conventions-statement-120809). 
81 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, Report of the Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 84th Cong., 1st Sess, Exec. Rept. No.9, at 32 (1955). 
82 Id. 
83 See Jakob Kellenberger, President of the ICRC, Ceremony to Celebrate the 60th An-
niversary of the Geneva Conventions (Aug. 12, 2009) (transcript available at http://www. 
icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-president-12 
0809.htm). 
84 Spoerri, supra note 80. 
85 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520–21 (2004). 
86 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629–35; see also Jason W. Hobbes, Note, To Boldly Go Where No Sig-
natory Has Gone Before: How the Military Commissions Act of 2006 Has Rewritten the United States’ 
Obligations Under the Geneva Conventions, 26 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 489, 495–96 (2007) (“This 
decision affirmed the relevance of . . . the Geneva Conventions.”). 
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ble by civilized peoples.’”87 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court 
similarly found the Geneva Conventions, specifically Article 118 of Ge-
neva III, very relevant to its analysis of whether or not the executive was 
permitted to detain the petitioner for an indefinite or perpetual period 
of time.88 The Court noted that Geneva III reflected a “clearly estab-
lished principle of the law of war.”89 A violation thereof was “apparently 
at odds” with the government’s own military regulations, and the “au-
thority” they claimed to be “acting in accordance with.”90 
 It is also plausible that if the Supreme Court had taken the case, it 
would have ruled that a narrowing of § 2241 to preclude claims based 
on the Geneva Conventions is not an unconstitutional suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus.91 Justice Scalia made a persuasive argument in 
his dissent in St. Cyr that the Constitution only mandates protection of 
the writ as understood in 1789.92 If this were the case, the Geneva Con-
ventions would most certainly be excluded from the protection of the 
Suspension Clause.93 It is also unclear whether the Geneva Conventions 
are self-executing.94 If they require additional legislation to be imple-
mented domestically, the argument that they should be guaranteed as a 
source of rights would be weakened.95 While Noriega argues that Sec-
tion 5(a) acts as a complete repudiation of the treaty, others see the 
MCA as consistently upholding the treaty internationally, but refraining 
from implementing it fully domestically.96 
 Clarification on this issue would have provided the political 
branches and the courts with “much-needed guidance” on the question 
of whether or not petitioners like Noriega are permitted to bring ha-
beas suits based on provisions of the Geneva Conventions.97 Both the 
judiciary and the legislature appear uncertain as to the extent Section 
5(a) has affected claims involving the Geneva Conventions.98 In some 
federal cases, for instance Al-Bihani v. Obama, the court has held that 
Section 5(a) “explicitly precludes detainees from claiming the Geneva 
                                                                                                                      
87 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630, 631–32 (quoting Geneva III art. 3). 
88 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520–21. 
89 Id. at 520. 
90 Id. at 550–51. 
91 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 342–44 
92 See id. 
93 See id. at 342. 
94 See Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1004; Reichstein, supra note 35, at 878–79. 
95 See Reichstein, supra note 35, at 878–79. 
96 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 21, at 3–4; see Bradley, supra note 42. 
97 Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1002. 
98 See id. at 1007–08. 
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Conventions . . . as a source of rights.”99 In other decisions, such as Al 
Rabiah v. United States, the court granted habeas corpus review while 
consulting the Geneva Conventions in its analysis of the issue.100 These 
conflicting interpretations over the exact relationship between the 
MCA and the Conventions will only propagate confusion in the lower 
courts.101 Authors of a Congressional Research Service report regarding 
pending legislation have commented that “[t]he Supreme Court deci-
sion in Boumediene . . . leaves open a number of Constitutional questions 
regarding the scope of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and options open to 
Congress. . . . Accordingly, it remains unclear whether statutory en-
hancements of habeas review can ever be rolled back without implicat-
ing the Suspension Clause.”102 
 Answering the question of whether Section 5(a) implicates the 
Suspension Clause would be a significant step toward clarifying the is-
sue plaguing the courts and the legislature. Even if the Court found 
that Section 5(a) was constitutional, however, unresolved questions re-
garding the extent of its application would remain.103 The statute could 
mean that a litigant does not have a right of access to federal courts if 
his only claim is based on the Geneva Conventions.104 Nevertheless, if 
he has multiple claims, it might be possible that a final decision could 
reference the Conventions in the holding.105 Another interpretation of 
that statute could be that the Conventions can never be referenced or 
used in any federal decision involving the United States or its agents.106 
The court in Al Rabiah may have taken the former view, finding that 
Section 5(a) does not prohibit the judiciary from referencing the Con-
ventions as one of many sources of rights guaranteed to the peti-
tioner.107 These issues will remain unclear until the Supreme Court 
takes the first step and addresses the Suspension Clause argument. 
                                                                                                                      
99 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Noriega v. Pastrana, 
564 F.3d 1290, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). 
100 Al Rabiah v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 2d 11, 33, 39, 42 (D.D.C. 2009). It is un-
clear as to the extent the court relied upon the Conventions in its decision to grant habeas 
review of the case. See id. 
101 See Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1007–08. 
102 Jennifer K. Elsea & Michael John Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33180, 
Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court 42–43 
(2010). 
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Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court had an opportunity with Noriega v. Pastrana to 
make significant progress toward resolving confusion in the lower 
courts and in Congress over the constitutionality of MCA Section 5(a). 
When Congress removed the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights 
for litigants in suits against the United States in the 2006 MCA, it re-
moved a substantive body of rights that had been available to petition-
ers since 1882. Even though the Geneva Conventions were not part of 
U.S. law in 1789, the Supreme Court has recognized the potential for 
expanding the writ’s protections beyond its initial scope. The Court has 
never directly addressed whether the writ has expanded in this way, and 
if so, how far its coverage extends. Though resolving this issue is unlike-
ly to end all of the confusion over the application of Section 5(a), it 
would nonetheless provide a tremendous amount of clarification. For 
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